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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
NoT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL
ONE MAY 0BTAIN DAMAGES

TIVE COVENANT-The

PROTECTION OF LAWS--WHETHER OR
FOR BREACH OF A RACIAL RESTRIC-

Supreme Court of Oklahoma, through the medium

of the case of Correll v. Earley,1 was recently faced with the difficult task
of determining whether or not one who claimed to have been injured by
another with whom he had entered into a racial restrictive covenant relating to land could maintain an action for breach of covenant. The case
was one in which the parties had covenanted that neither the owner, nor
1-

Okla. -,

237 P. (2d) 1017 (1951).
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his successors or assigns, should sell, lease, or give away any property in
the restricted area to any person of the Negro or African race, and any conveyance so made should be void and be set aside. It was claimed that the
principal defendant, one of the covenanting parties, had conveyed to Earley, a financially irresponsible person, on the understanding that he was to
convey to certain Negroes, which he subsequently did do. The plaintiff then
brought action against the covenantor, against his grantee Earley, and
the grantees named in the deed executed by Earley, seeking to have the
conveyances set aside and damages assessed for the resulting alleged depreciation to the value of plaintiff's property. The plaintiff particularly
relied on the theory that the harm sustained was the direct result of a
conspiracy perpetrated by the defendants. While the suit was pending,
the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in the
case of Shelley v. Kraemer.2 The defendants thereupon demurred to.
plaintiff's entire petition and the trial court sustained such demurrer.
Plaintiff refused to plead further, the suit was dismissed, and plaintiff
then appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. That court,
in a unanimous opinion, overruled the demurrer to the petition although
it agreed that to rule the conveyance void would be a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Regardless of
this, the court decided that the covenant, standing alone, did not violate
the federal constitution and, as between the parties, was to be deemed
valid and binding. 4 It treated the action, considered as one for damages,
as being an action not by the state but by an individual, hence not within
the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment since that amendment
does not purport to protect a citizen from the effect of discriminatory
action by an individual. 5 There being no rule against a plaintiff's right
to collect damages if he had been injured by reason of a breach of a valid
and binding contract, it was the conclusion of the court that if, as was
here charged, there existed a vicious conspiracy to induce a breach of
covenant, all of the parties participating therein were to be held liable
in damages.
The instant case is one of four on the question of damages in racial
covenant situations which have come before reviewing courts since the
2334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1947).
3 U. S. Coust., Amend. 14, provides, in part, that no state "shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens . . . not deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
4 The court relied on Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed.
969 (1926), as well as the view taken in the Kraemer case that the covenant was
not, per se, void for illegality.
5 It was pointed out, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 at 8, 3 S. Ct. 18 at 21,
27 L. Ed. 835 at 839 (1883), that an "individual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject matter of the Amendment."
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decision in the Kraemer case. 6 The first of these cases, being the case of
Weiss v. Leaon,7 was predicated on substantially the same reasoning as
that used in the instant case and led the Supreme Court of Missouri to
uphold a complaint designed to recover damages for breach of such a covenant.

In the second, that of Roberts v. Curtiss a federal district court

in the District of Columbia refused to grant damages on the ground
that to do so would violate the spirit of the Kraemer case, but the opinion
therein, unfortunately, was extremely brief. Following the instant case,
the most recent decision on the subject was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in the case of Phillips v. Naff.9 That court, flatly
rejecting the doctrine that damages might be obtained for breach of
a covenant of the type in question, stated that to give relief in the form
of damages would be tantamount to an indirect enforcement of the covenant. Imposition of damages, the court indicated, might well prove to be
as effective a means of enforcement as would a decree of a court of equity
declaring a conveyance void or enjoining a proposed transfer. The practical effect of awarding damages, said the court, would be to impose an
unwarranted burden on the power of alienation. Furthermore, a judgment of a court assessing damages would be a form of official state action
sufficient to bring it within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment,
for the state action there referred to extends to all forms of exercise of
state power. This even division in the cases arising since the Kraemer
decision invites an inquiry into the fundamental problem.
It is clear that direct restraints upon alienation, being opposed
to public policy in general,' 0 are to be deemed void and of no effect," and the few cases which have reached a contrary result represent
an extreme minority view. 12 Courts did, however, adopt a more lenient
attitude toward covenants of a partially restrictive character and, prior
6 In

Tovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393, 82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO178, the Supreme Court of Illinois, relying on the Kraemer case,
held it was proper to refuse equitable enforcement of a racial restrictive covenant
but no issue was reached with respect to a right to recover damages for the breach
KENT LAW REVrEW

thereof. That issue remains open in Illinois.

7359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. (2d) 127 (1949), noted In 30 Bost. U. L. Rev. 273, 18
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 38 Geo. L. J. 678, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1062, 98 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 588.
893 F. Supp. 604 (1950).
9Mich. -, 52 N. W. (2d) 158 (1952).
10 See, for example, Payne v. Hart, 178 Ark. 100, 9 S. W. (2d) 1059 (1928)
Voellinger v. Kirchner, 314 Ill. 398, 145 N. E. 638 (1924) ; Goldsmith v. Peterson,
159 Iowa 692, 144 N. W. 60 (1913) : Minor v. Shipley, 21 Ohio App. 236, 152 N. E.
768 (1923) ; Cobb v. Moore, 90 W. Va. 63, 110 S. E. 458 (1922).
11 Simes, Future Interests, Vol. 2, §§ 444 and 447.
12 Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S. W. 247, L. R. A. 1916D
924 (1916). A restriction on alienation during the lifetime of the grantor has been
held valid: Peters v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N. W. 917, 67 A. L. R.
1311 (1929).
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to the Kraemer case, did generally enforce racial restrictive covenants,' 3
treating them as a form of partial restraint only. In fact, money damages
have been awarded to a vendee who purchased land relying on the vendor's
fraudulent misrepresentation that the property was protected by a racial
14
restrictive covenant when, in fact, it was not so protected.
It was the contention of the plaintiff in the instant case that, while
the Kraemer case prevented equitable enforcement of the covenant, the
rule as to recovery of damages for a breach thereof remained the same5
as it would be for the breach of any other form of restrictive covenant.'
Even if such was not the case, it was contended that an action would lie,
in tort, against one who wilfully induced another to breach a contract. 16
By so contending, the plaintiff propounded questions which reach to the
heart of the problem and reveal a hopeless, and yet to be resolved, conflict
between two fundamental constitutional ideas, one which guarantees to
every citizen a right to secure a remedy for every wrong, 17 the other which
forbids any form of discriminatory action by a state government.
Leaving the immediate issue aside for the moment, the weight of authority certainly used to be that, while injunctive relief might be denied
as being a matter of equitable grace rather than a matter of right, it was
not improper for a court to grant damages for violation of a binding
covenant, which damages, in a case like the instant one, would be measured
by the difference in value, at the time of breach, between that fixed for
property protected by the restriction as against the value of property left
without such protection.' 8 Absent illegality in the covenant, enforcement thereof by the assessment of damages produced by a breach was
deemed a matter of right, provided actual damage could be shown. Many
cases of the type here under consideration might well founder over the
damage element, for it might not be possible to prove any devaluation in
property values by reason of the presence of the excluded group in adja13 Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. (2d) 869, 162 A. L. R. 168 (1945), cert. den. 325 U. S.
868, 65 S. Ct. 1406, 89 L. Ed. 1087 J1945) ; Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. (2d) 818,
151 P. (2d) 260 (1944) ; Burke v. Kleiman. 277 Il1. App. 519 (1934) ; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 2-95, 196 A. 330, 114 A. L. R. 1227 (1938) ; Hemsley v. Sage, 194
Okla. 669, 154 P. (2d) 577 (1945).
14 Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 P. 822 (1930).
15 On the question of the right to secure an award of damages, see Welitoff v.
Kohl, 105 N. J. Eq. 181, 147 A. 390, 66 A. L. R. 1317 (1929), and Womack v. Ward,
186 S. W. (2d) 619 (Tenn. App., 1945), but neither of these cases concerns a racial
restrictive covenant. See also 7 R. C. L., Covenants, p. 1165 et seq., and R. C. L.
Perm. Supp., p. 2149.
16 11 Am. Jur., Conspiracy, § 48, p. 580. The case of Shaw v. Moon, 117 Ore. 558,
245 P. 318, 45 A. L. R. 600 (1926), indicates that all persons unlawfully conspiring
to Injure another are to be held liable as joint tort feasors, at least as to acts done
by any one of them within the scope of the joint enterprise.
17 See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
IS Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N. J. Eq. 181, 147 A. 390, 66 A. L. R. 1317 (1929).
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cent property. Certainly, that question is too broad in scope to be answered with a word, 19 but, assuming there would be devaluation, it is
necessary to return to the fundamental problem.
If the United States Supreme Court, in the Kraemer case, had flatly
declared all racial restrictive covenants void on the basis of an opposition
to a clear public policy, it would have resolved the basic conflict, provided it possessed the power to fix the policy of the several states, on local
questions, as well as that of the United States on federal matters. If
such had been the case, no person would be able to claim a right based
on such a covenant or be in a position to demand his constitutionally
guaranteed remedy for the asserted wrong done for, without a right, there
would be no wrong. But the court did not do so, and it is questionable
if it could declare a public policy for the several states in relation to local
matters. It is, then, necessary to consider the other point, i.e. would
state action, by way of assessment of damages, represent a prohibited form
of state activity?
It is here, in the final analysis, that restrictive covenants must stand
or fall when tested by the federal constitution. True, the prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to state action and not to the
acts of private individuals,2 0 for the amendment erects no shield against
private conduct, however discriminatory. 21 On that basis, it may be said
that restrictive covenants, standing alone, do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as the purposes thereof are effectuated by no more
than voluntary adherence thereto. Is it not clear, however, that it would
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to enforce them
by way of judicial action, regardless of the form thereof?
The Supreme Court has said that persons may, if they wish, enter
into a contract that is discriminatory in nature. 22 The mere act of entering into such a contract in no way can be said to be the considered action
of the state. When voluntary adherence is no longer present, when the
agreement has been breached, and one party asks an agency of the state
to grant relief against the breach, whether by injunction or in the form
of damages, an entirely different situation appears. The state then must,
necessarily, act through its agencies, 23 for it is not capable of acting in
any other way. Action by a state court and of its judicial officers, serv19 A study of a possible decline in assessed valuations of real property for tax
purposes in neighborhoods passing through a change in occupancy might reveal
highly informative data on the point.
20 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926).
21 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
22 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R. A. 1918C
210, Ann. Cas. 1918A 1201 (1917).
23 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880).
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ing in their official capacities, can be regarded as nothing else but state
action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 According
to Twining v. New Jersey,25 the judicial act of the highest court of the

state, engaged in construing the state's own law, is an act of the state
itself, hence it follows that where a state court, enforcing the state's own
common law, reaches a result contrary to rights protected by the Four26
teenth Amendment, that result is necessarily unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in the Phillips case, took cognizance
of these concepts when it delivered what is definitely the more reasonable
view on the instant problem. If state courts may be used to secure an
award of damages for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant, the fear
of being penalized by way of damages could prove to be just as great a
deterrent against breach as would be a judicial decree enforcing the terms
of the covenant. To a great extent, that result would nullify the beneficial effects of the Kraemer case.
It has been five years since the United States Supreme Court there
refused to allow equitable enforcement of racial restrictive covenants.
The prevailing uncertainty as to the legal liability of parties to pay damages for the breach of such covenants now virtually requires Supreme
Court action to lay that uncertainty to rest. Such action should be forthcoming without delay in order to obviate those doubts which may be
operating to block the free transfer of much seemingly restricted land.
R. L.

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE--WHETHER
NATING STATEMENTS IS

GLOBOKAR

OR NOT EvrDENcE OF INCRIMI-

ADMISSIBLE WHEN OBTAINED THROUGH USE OF A

MICROPHONE CONCEALED ON THE PERSON

OF AN UNDERCOvER AGEN--In

the recent case of On Lee v. United States,' the courts were again con-

fronted with an evidentiary problem concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained through the use of concealed scientific apparatus. The
petitioner had been convicted under a two-count indictment, one count
charging the offence of selling opium, the other with conspiracy to sell.2
According to the record, petitioner operated a Chinese hand laundry with
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 (1880).
See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. ft.
25 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908).
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897).
26 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192, 159 A. L. R.
1346 (1941) ; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568,
85 L. Ed. 855 (1941).
1 - U. S. -, 72 S. Ct. 967, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 770 (1952), affirming 193 F. (2d)
306 (1951). Justices Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter and Black each wrote a dissenting opinion.
221 U. S. C. A. § 173 and 18 U. S. C. A. § 371.
24
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living quarters in the rear of the store. A government "undercover"
agent had once worked for petitioner and appeared to be an old friend.
This agent visited the laundry one day and engaged the petitioner in
conversation, at which time petitioner made some incriminating statements.
Unknown to petitioner, the agent had been wired for sound, with a small
microphone concealed in an inside overcoat pocket and with a small antenna
running along the inside of the sleeve. A federal narcotics agent, stationed outside with a receiving set properly tuned to pick up sounds from
the microphone, heard the entire conversation. A few days later, another
conversation took place, this time on the sidewalk outside the laundry,
The evidence so
and the damaging admissions were again "audited."
obtained was admitted over petitioner's contention that it should have
been excluded because the manner by which it was obtained violated both
the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act.3 It was further claimed that the
proof was inadmissible under the judicial power to require fair play in
the enforcement of federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit sustained the conviction by a divided court, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 That court, divided five to four, found
(1) there had been no trespass, hence no violation of the Fourth Amendments; (2) no violation of the Federal Communications Act, as petitioner
had no wireless and no wires; and (3) no abuse of "fair play," as it
would be contrary to public policy to deprive the government of the benefit
of petitioner's admissions simply because its officers had not played according to the rules. The conviction was, therefore, affirmed.
The conduct of law enforcement officers, when seeking to obtain evidence upon which to base a criminal prosecution, has frequently created
problems, thereby forcing courts to weigh the propriety of the means
used against the necessity for unhampered police processes. The use of
mechanical and scientific devices, not police innovations in themselves, has
similarly raised questions. Probably the simplest and oldest medium of
detection, utilized without the knowledge of the accused, is that of eavesdropping, such as standing on a public walk outside of a door or window
and listening to conversations within. In that situation there is no trespass
and no illegal entry so, as a general rule, the conversation overheard may
be introduced in evidence, both in federal and state courts, provided the
evidence is relevant. 5 Evidence obtained through spies also comes within
this rule,6 but while the means used will not affect admissibility it could
3 47 U. S. 0. A. § 605.

4342 U. S. 941, 72 S. Ct. 560, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 372 (1952).
5 Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894).
6 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928);
Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61. 109 S. W. 1149 (1908).
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have bearing on the credibility of such evidence. 7 The admissibility of
that which is overheard by a bystander to one side of a telephone conversation has likewise been governed by the rule relating to the admissibility
of oral conversations, 8 provided the person testifying can positively identify the speaker.9
With the advent of the phonograph and other recording devices, the
mechanical reproduction of conversations served to create new evidentiary
problems but state courts have generally admitted evidence procured
through these devices. Thus, in State v. Perkins,'0 the recording of a
confession on a recording machine stationed in a room other than the one
where the conversation occurred, with a microphone hidden in the speaker's
room, was held admissible in evidence. In Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick," a
"speak-o-phone" was used, with a microphone in the conversant 's room
running to an adjoining room where a man was stationed with ear phones
and a recording machine, and the evidence so obtained was admitted. 12
In much the same way, evidence obtained through the use of a dictograph
has been accepted.'"
The question of the admissibility of evidence obtained by wire-tapping,
on the other hand, has caused much controversy in the federal courts
although, with the passage of the Federal Communications Act,1 4 the
question is now fairly well settled. In 1928, the United States Supreme
Court, faced with the problem of wire-tapping for the first time, took
jurisdiction over the case of Olmstead v. United States.'9 The defendants
there concerned had been convicted for violating the National Prohibition
Act. Federal officers had tapped telephone wires leading from the offices
and residences of the defendants over a period of several months. When
it was made to appear that all tapping had been carried on outside of the
defendants' property, a divided Supreme Court held that, as there had
been no trespass, there was no search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. Fourteen years later, in Goldman v. United
7 Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894).
s Takashi v. Hecht Co., 62 App. D. C. 72, 64 F. (2d) 710 (1933).
9 Morton v. United States, 60 F. (2d) 696 (1932) ; People v. Metcoff, 392 Ill. 418,
64 N. E. (2d) 869 (1946) ; Miles v. Andrews, 153 Ill. 262, 38 N. E. 644 (1894).
10355 Mo. 851, 198 S. W. (2d) 704 (1946).
11 123 Conn. 218, 193 A. 765 (1937).
12 See also Commonwealth v. Clark, 123 Pa. Super. 277, 187 A. 237 (1936).
13 Schoborg v. United States, 264 F. 9 (1920) ; Brindley v. State, 193 Ala. 43,
69 So. 536 (1915) ; State v. Minn. Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144 N. W. 412 (1913).
14 47 U. S. C. A. § 605, in part, states: ".... no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person."
15 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928). Justices Brandeis, Holmes,
Butler, and Stone each wrote a dissenting opinion.
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States,16 the issue was again presented but this time in a case where federal

officers had placed a detectaphone against the outer wall of defendant's
office and had listened to conversations and phone calls carried on therein.
Adhering to the Olmstead decision, the court again found no trespass or
unlawful entry which could violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
By its holding in McGuire v. United States, 17 the court limited the doctrine
of trespass ab initio to civil actions, thereby affirming the views of the
Olmstead and Goldman decisions, so as to make an actual trespass essential
before a basis could be found to exclude evidence surreptitiously obtained.
With the enactment of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act,18 Congress displayed an intention to place a limitation upon wiretapping methods, but it was not until the United States Supreme Court
decided the case of Nardone v. Uited States19 that the extent of the limitation was made clear. The court there held that the interception of
telephone communications by wire-tapping was a violation of Section 605;
that the term "persons," as used in the statute, included federal officers;
and that the statute applied to both interstate and intrastate communications intercepted by federal officers. The court further declared that a
divulgence within the purview of Section 605 would occur whenever the
language of the intercepted message was recited in court. At present,
however, it would appear that the burden is on the accused to prove that
the wire-tapping was unlawfully employed and that
a substantial part of
20
the case against him was procured in that fashion.
Although some state courts have followed the federal view on the subject, a majority of the state courts are directly opposed to the federal rule.
In People v. Channell,21 for example, the California Appellate Court held
that it was not bound by the federal rule on wire-tapping, and it approved
22
the admission of evidence obtained in that fashion.
An analysis of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on
the question of the admissibility of evidence obtained through the use of
scientific devices would reveal a sharp line of conflict between those judges
who would encourage the use of such means as an aid to achieving the end
and those judges who believe that the end cannot justify the means.
While the instant decision conforms to precedent, the strong dissent of
16 316 U. S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942).

Justice Murphy wrote a

dissenting opinion.

17 273 U. S. 95, 47 S. Ct. 259, 71 L. Ed. 556 (1927).
1s47 U. S. C. A. § 605.

19 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937).
20 See Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269, 84 L. Ed. 298 (1939),

and United States v. Polakoff, 112 F. (2d) 888 (1940).
21107 Cal. App. (2d) 192, 236 P. (2d) 654 (1951).
22 See also People v. Kelly, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943) ; Hubin v. State,
180 Md. 279, 23 A. (2d) 706 (1942).
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Justice Brandeis in the Olmstead case and the dissents of Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Douglas and Black in the instant case would indicate
that the question is far from being laid at rest. Under the majority view,
the adoption of trickery by federal officers will not, by itself, render evidence inadmissible in the absence of a trespass such as would make the
search and seizure illegal. In opposition, the minority view would limit
the extent to which federal officers may employ "dirty business" in their
efforts to obtain evidence of crime. Viewed in the light of the more
recent judicial policy regarding permissible methods for obtaining confessions, 23 as well as the congressional policy relating to wire-tapping,
there is fair reason to believe that technical distinctions will not be permitted to prevail but that federal law enforcement officers will eventually
have to act fairly even in such matters as the suppression of crime.
M. MICHAELS

HUSBAND AND

WIE-ABANDONMENT---WHETHEI'

HUSBAND

IS JUSTI-

Fim IN LEAVING HOME WHEN WIFE ABANDONS RELIGIOUS TENETS WHICH
HUSBAND AND WIFE ESPOUSED AT TIME OF THEIR MARRIAGF-In the New

York case of Rosner v. Rosner,' the nisi prius court was asked to consider whether, upon a wife's abandonment of the religious tenets which
she and her husband espoused at the time of their marriage, the husband
was justified in leaving the home and entitled to succeed in a suit for
separation. The scant facts appearing in the opinion therein would indicate that the petitioner and her husband had, prior to marriage, orally
agreed to establish a home in which, rather than other alternatives sometimes selected by Jewish people, the religious observances should be orthodox in character. The parties did so live for a time but petitioner began
to substitute charitable and educational activities for home duties and
home life, and began to press her husband to finance a medical school education for her to further her plans for social work. She even abandoned
"Kashruth," or the serving of foods in non-contaminable dishware only,
ceased to serve strictly "Kosher" foods, and refused to participate in
other orthodox rites, so that the husband and their daughter could no
longer partake of home life like that which originally had been planned.
These events caused the husband to leave the home, whereupon the wife
sued for a separation decree in her favor. The husband countered with a
cross-complaint for separation, basing his action on an alleged constructive
abandonment. He appears to have been successful in his request, thereby
23 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).

1-

Misc. -,

108 N. Y. S. (2d) 196 (1952).

has been taken therein.

It does not appear that any appeal
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posing a problem concerning the extent to which the free exercise of
religious worship may run counter to the desire to maintain and preserve
the marital status of the parties.
It was President Jefferson, according to a quotation in Reynolds v.
".

United States, who said:

.

religion is a matter which lies solely

between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship; I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the American people

.

.

.

building a wall of separation between church

and state." 2 To him, and to others who have made similar utterances, is
attributable the noticeable lack of judicial decisions in the United States
bearing upon legal problems involving religious aspects. But the courts
are beginning to be caught up in a net of problems produced by a rise
in the number of inter-faith marriages and are having difficulty therewith
by reason of the phenomenon described by sociologists as the "cultural
lag." It is not surprising, therefore, that no clear-cut precedent exists by
which to settle the instant problem, although it represents a situation
which is likely to be forced upon the courts for solution more and more
frequently in the future.
Treating the problem simply as one involving desertion, without regard to the religious aspects, it would appear that purported distinctions
as to purpose and scope have been made between desertion and abandonment, 3 but such distinctions have not been given credence in statutory
enactments nor have they been favored by text writers who have carefully
examined the problem. 4
The essence of the offense lies in the separation of the married parties for a length of time, the period being frequently designated by statute, without justification, either in the form of
consent or by the wrongful conduct of the complainant, and with the intention of not returning. 5 There is disagreement among the courts 6 and
the writers7 as to whether the marital offense must be the equivalent of a
ground for divorce in order to justify the claim of desertion. Illinois has
adopted a conservative view on the point,8 one most often applied elseat 249 (1878).
Pierson v. Pierson, 15 N. J. Misc. 195, 189 A. 391 (1937).
See Schouler, Divorce Manual (Warren, Banks & Co., Albany, 1944), § 112, at

298 U. S. 145 at 164, 25 L. Ed. 244
3

4

p. 141.
5 Schouler, op. cit., § 111, at p. 139.
6Compare Frank v. Frank, 178 Ill. App. 557 (1913), with Deisler v. Deisler, 59

App. Div. 207, 69 N. Y. S. 326 (1901).
7 See Keezer and Moriand, Marriage and Divorce (Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., Indianapolis, 1946), § 391, at p. 458, and Schouler, op. cit., § 120, at p. 167.
8 Frank v. Frank, 178 Ill. App. 557 (1913).
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where in the constructive desertion cases, 9 but that view is not universal'
and a different viewpoint has been taken when the abandoned party is the
The general nature of the conduct relied on,
one seeking the divorce."
however, must be inconsistent with the marital relation or be such that
it renders cohabitation unsafe or unbearable,' 2 and courts will not sustain the withdrawal except for the gravest and most compelling reasons,
reasons which involve the fundamental happiness or self-respect of the
Samples of conduct which have been said to be
withdrawing spouse.'8
putting
of the husband in an asylum without just
the
include
sufficient
15
14
the failure
cause, the abuse and neglect of the wife by the husband,
16
of the husband to support the wife when able, and the refusal of sexual
relationships. 17 On the other hand, simple neglect' 8 or failure to provide,
in the absence of aggravating circumstances, has been deemed insufficient. 19 With particular regard to neglect, the neglect must, under statutory enactments, be gross in character 2 0 and not mere slovenliness and
laziness. In Illinois, for example, it has been held that a showing of uncleanliness and laziness on the part of a wife, both with respect to herself
and the children, would be insufficient to justify the husband's withdrawal
21
from the family home.

Applying these standards to controversies involving religious difficulties between the parties, the general rule which has evolved is one
that treats mere differences of opinion in matters of religion as being inThus, a mere neglect
adequate to constitute a ground for divorce.'
9 Nelson, Divorce (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1945), 2d Ed. by Henderson, § 4.16,
at p. 101.
10 Campbell v. Campbell, 110 Conn. 277, 147 A. 800 (1929) ; Kruse v. Kruse, 179
Md. 657, 22 A. (2d) 475 (1941) ; Poole v. Poole, 176 Md. 696, 6 A. (2d) 243 (1939) ;
Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (1933); Schwartz v. Schwartz,
158 Md. 80, 148 A. 259 (1930).
11 Nelson, op. cit., at p. 102.
12 Kinsey v. Kinsey, 37 Ala. 393 (1861) ; Harding v. Harding, 22 Md. 337 (1864);
Fera v. Fera, 98 Mass. 155 (1867) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 81 N. J. Eq. 479, 86 A. 935,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 711 (1913) ; Sower's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 173 (1879).
13 Higgins v. Higgins, 222 Ala. 44, 130 So. 677 (1930) ; Jones v. Jones, 95 Ala. 443,
11 So. 11, 18 L. R. A. 95 (1891).
14 Osterhout v. Osterhout, 30 Kans. 746, 2 P. 864 (1883).
15 Mecke v. Mecke, 126 Kans. 760, 271 P. 275 (1928).
16 Lee v. Lee, 38 Okla. 388, 132 P. 1070 (1913).
17 Leach v. Leach, 46 Kans. 724, 27 P. 131 (1891).
18 Petty v. Petty, 147 Kans. 342, 76 P. (2d) 850 (1938).
19 Berry v. Berry, 18 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 521 (1915).
20 Coleman v. Coleman, 68 Ohio App. 410, 41 N. E. (2d) 734 (1941) ; Hanover v.
Hanover, 34 Ohio App. 483, 171 N. E. 350 (1929). But see Petty v. Petty, 147 Kans.
342, 76 P. (2d) 850 (1938).
21 Winterberg v. Winterberg, 177 Ill. App. 499 (1913) ; Hunter v. Hunter, 121 I.
App. 380 (1905).
22 Schouler, op. cit., § 120, at p. 168.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

arising from participation in religious affairs, 23 unless accompanied by
barbarous and cruel treatment, 24 will be inadequate.
It has, likewise,
been found that disagreement as to church affiliations ;25 a change of
religious beliefs and an attempt to proselytize the wife ;26 a refusal to
allow the spouse and children to attend a certain church ;27 a systematic
refusal to permit attendance at a certain Sunday school without a row ;28
a refusal to give up a certain church after a pre-marital promise to do so,
resulting in continual bickering between the spouses ;29 or religious differences plus the breach of a pre-marital promise to attend church,30 will
be insufficient to serve as grounds for divorce or separation. In contrast
thereto, there is a group of cases which hold that refusal by one spouse
to cohabit with the other, following a civil ceremony but without the celebration of religious rites, entitles the other to seek relief by way of divorce
or separation, 3 1 particularly so if both parties belong to a sect which
prohibits cohabitation without a religious ceremony. The same rule has
been applied in New Hampshire 32 and has been enacted into statutory
form in Kentucky.33 However, there are a few decisions to the effect
3 4
that, in such situations, an annulment should be granted, as for fraud.
One writer has well said that the public interest in cases where no cohabitation has taken place is so substantially lessened that simple fraud
should be a valid cause for terminating the incomplete marriage, 35 but
Illinois has not, as yet, seen fit to recognize this distinction. 36
It is evident that the American desire for separation between church
and state has, for the most part, caused American courts to take an objective view and to apply customary civil law relating to desertion and fraud
23

Nelson, op. cit., § 3.07, at p. 52, cites Hickman v. Hickman, 10 S. W. (2d) 738

(Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
24 Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Pa. Super. 53 (1906).
25 Hickman v. Hickman, 10 S. W. (2d) 738 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
26 Trautman v. Krauss, 159 La. 371, 105 So. 376 (1925).
27

Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 Paige 267 (N. Y., 1832).

Arnold v. Arnold, 116 Ark. 32, 170 S. W. 486 (1914).
Meffert v. Meffert, 118 Ark. 582, 177 S. W. 1 (1915).
30 Hickman v. Hickman, 10 S. W. (2d) 738 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
31 Knibbs v. Knibbs, 94 N. J. Eq. 747, 121 A. 715 (1923) ; Mirizio v. MiriZlo, 242
N. Y. 74, 150 N. E. 605 (1926), Cane and Lehman, JJ., dissented. See also annotations in 58 A. L. R. 462, 44 A. L. R. 726, and 28 A. L. R. 1136.
32 Fitts v. Fitts, 46 N. H. 184 (1865).
33 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.020(f).
34 Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639, 142 A. 97 (1928) ; Auflero v. Aufiero, 222
App. Div. 479, 226 N. Y. S. 611 (1928), noted in 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1002; Watkins
v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 180 N. Y. S. 860 (1920) ; Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117 Misc.
728, 191 N. Y. S. 868 (1922) ; Rubinson v. Rubinson, 110 Misc. 114, 181 N. Y. S. 28
(1920), noted in 20 Cal. L. Rev. 708. See also note on Despatie v. Despatie, 37
T. L. R. 395 (1926), in 30 Yale L. J. 756.
35 See note in 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1003.
36 Hull v. Hull, 199 Ill. App. 307 (1915).
28
29
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in these cases. That trend also prevails in a more carefully reasoned
group of authorities wherein the gist of the action appears to rest on
cruelty alleged to result from the religious practices of one spouse upon
the other, or upon the family. In some of these cases objective tests of
cruelty, it would seem, have been dangerously disregarded under the guise
of protecting the offended spouse from religious persecution by the remedy
of divorce or separation. Thus, the New Hampshire case of Robinson v.
Robinson 7 held it proper to grant the husband a divorce, even though the
wife was recognized to be a peaceful person and a good mother, because
her practice of a certain religion, opposed by her husband, caused him
to become morose and inattentive to his business, to occasionally suffer
from insomnia and loss of appetite, and to become generally despondent
and unhappy because of his changed marital status. Admitting that the
conduct complained of was, in itself, innocent and even laudable, and
was pursued from a sense of duty, the court said it still did not "afford
a sufficient reason for requiring the party injured by it to submit to the
destruction of health, reason, or life." 38s The Idaho case of DeCloedt v.
DeCloedt3" also held that "religious persecution" by the wife, consisting
,of a constant, firm pressure to join her church, vilifying the petitioner's
church and its leaders, coercion to "pray the beads," and the like, which
thoroughly sickened the husband, entitled him to secure a divorce on the
ground of cruelty. The court there indicated that the right to practice
and hold to that faith and belief which accorded with the judgment of
the person must be conceded, as between husband and wife, the same
after marriage as before, since that right should exist between all persons.
In other cases, cruelty has been considered from an objective standpoint
without regard to its basis in religion.4
It has been said, for example,
that if the result of the practice of a certain religion, considered objectively, was of a nature to threaten the defendant's wife and children with
extreme poverty and loss of social status, it would constitute a ground for
divorce. 41 The Arizona case of Smith v. Smith 42 reached a similar result
where the wife's practice of religion, upon becoming a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, operated to disrupt and destroy her husband's home
43
life and family relationships.
37 66 N. H. 600, 23 A. 362, 15 L. R. A. 121 (1891).
38 66 N. H. 600 at 610, 23 A. 362 at 365.
39 24 Ida. 277, 133 P. 664 (1913).
4oHammond v. Hammond, 74 Tex. 414, 12 S. W. 90 (1889).
41 Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, 111 So. 683, 58 A. L. R. 462 (1927).
4261 Ariz. 373, 149 P. (2d) 683 (1944).
43 Two alienation of affections cases might also be noted. In Buckley v. Francis,
78 Utah 606, 6 P. (2d) 188 (1932), it was held that where a church elder kissed
plaintiff's spouse as part of a religious rite such fact should have been considered
in determining whether a cause of action existed under the facts there appearing.
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To generalize from these investigations, it might be said that the
holding in the instant case superficially tends to set a precedent for protection of religious liberty through state divorce proceedings, but it represents a potentially unhealthy development when viewed from a constitutional standpoint. True, the wording of the opinion therein emphasizes
the objective results likely to flow from a refusal to conform to agreed
religious practices. At worst, it is no more than mildly novel in view of
the conflict which exists between the authorities generally regarding matters of justification.44 But if state courts, in divorce or separation matters, may limit the extent of the religious practices permissible within a
home, they could, by an easy step, undertake to prescribe the religious
rites which are to be practiced, as well as determine the when, where and
manner of their exercise. If the decision illustrates anything important,
it points to the need for devoting more resource to learning enough about
the degree of emotional maturity of persons contemplating marriage to
enable a better prediction to be made of the chance of success therein. 45
W. M.

JAMES,

JR,

JURY-RGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-WHETHER OR Nor STATE COURTS,
ARISING UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABImTY ACT, MUST
GRANT JURY TRIAL IN CONFORMITY WITH PRACTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS-

IN ACTIONS

The vexing problem of the extent to which state court practice must conform to federal law when actions based on federal legislation are brought
in state courts was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States
In Mohn v. Tigley, 191 Cal. 470, 217 P. (2d) 733 (1923), it was said that the fact
of donations by a spouse to a certain religious sect, and the interference of its

officials, in propounding its precepts, with plaintiff's management of her family
home, should have been considered by the jury.
44 It is doubtful if Illinois would reach a similar result In view of the restrictive
statutory definition of desertion to be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40,
§ 1. In that regard, it should be noted the New York proceeding was based on a
"separation" law, under which abandonment is the gist of the action. See Clevenger.
Practice Manual 1945, §§ 1165a and 1166, and Harvey v. Harvey, 175 N. Y. S. 177
(1919) ; DeVide v. DeVide, 174 N. Y. S. 774 (1919); Pearson v. Pearson, 173
N. Y. S. 563 (1918). See also Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed.
905 (1909).
45 One opinion, and sadly only one, was found in the course of this investigation
wherein the court seemed to expect mature judgment on the part of the complaining
spouse. The fact that it was rendered In 1832 may be significant. In Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 3 Paige 267 at 271 (N. Y., 1832), the jurist said: "Although it was an
act of great unkindness and of unreasonable oppression on the part of the husband
to use his marital power in separating his wife from the church of which she was
a member, and with which she preferred to worship, I have no hesitation in saying
that she mistook her duty in not submitting to the oppressor if she could not win
his consent by kindness and condescension .... A Christian wife and mother should
suffer much and long before she can be justified in resorting to the doubtful and
dangerous expedient of a suit for separation."
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in the recent case of Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Company.' One of the issues in that case involved the validity of a release
which had been signed by Dice, an injured railroad employee, who had
begun his suit in an Ohio common pleas court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 The trial jury found for the plaintiff, but the
trial judge later entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict because he
found the release to be valid. That holding was reversed by the Ohio
Court of Appeals, which in turn was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court
with one judge dissenting. The state supreme court held that Ohio, not
federal, law governed and under the controlling Ohio law factual issues as
to fraud in securing the release were properly to be decided by the judge
rather than the jury. The Supreme Court of the United States then
granted certiorari and, although divided five to four, it reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio. The essence of the majority holding was that the
right to trial by jury on the issue of the validity of the release formed
too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the federal statute to
permit of its classification as a mere rule of local procedure. The opposing view was to the effect that, despite the origin of the particular claim,
a state was under no duty to treat an action of the kind in question any
differently than it would adjudicate a similar problem involved in a local
action for negligent injury.
A seeming conflict between state and federal procedural law has
arisen over many other questions beside the instant jury problem. It
may be of interest to note that the federal rules have been held to prevail on such points as (1) the party who must bear the burden of proof
as to contributory negligence ;3 (2) the sufficiency of evidence to establish negligence ;4 and (3) the amount of evidence necessary to take the
case to the jury.5 On the other hand, state practice has been held to
1- U. S. -, 72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 285 (1952), reversing 155 Ohio St.
185, 98 N. E. (2d) 301 (1951). Justice Frankfurter, with whom Reed, Burton, and
Jackson, JJ., joined, concurred in the reversal but dissented from the reasoning of
the majority on the point in question.
2 45 U. S. C. A., § 51 et seq.
3 Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 S. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433,
Ann. Cas. 1916B 252 (1915). The court there said: ". . . it is a misnomer to say
that the question as to the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is a mere
matter of state procedure. For, in Vermont, and in a few other states, proof of
plaintiff's freedom from fault is a part of the very substance of his case. But the
United States courts have uniformly held that, as a matter of general law, the
burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. . . . Congress, in
passing the Federal Employers' Liability Act, evidently intended that the Federal
statute should be construed in the light of these and other decisions of the Federal
courts."
4 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Reverman's Adm'x, 288 Ky. 500, 15 S. W. (2d) 300
(1929). But compare with Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 104 S. C. 173.
88 S. K. 445 (1916), affirmed in 242 U. S. 620, 37 S. Ct. 241, 61 L. Ed. 532 (1917).
5 Lloyd v. Alton R. Co., 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S. W. (2d) 267 (1942), and Weaver v_
Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co., 343 Mo. 223, 120 S. W. (2d) 1105 (1938).
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control as to the manner of amending pleadings, 6 the manner of objecting
to the sufficiency of a pleading,7 the right to grant a partial new trial
on one issue only,8 as to the admissibility of evidence, 9 the time and
manner in which a substantive right must be asserted, 10 the manner by
which persons not sui juris may bring suit," the effective operation of
the statute of limitations,1 2 the degree of proof necessary to upset a release,' 8 and the function to be performed by the trial court in directing
14
the preparation of proper instructions for the jury.
As to the law which should control the right to trial by jury, the
majority opinion in the instant case would appear to be based on two
grounds, to-wit: (1) that jury trial is "part and parcel" of the remedy
afforded by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and (2) it is desirable
to have uniform application of the act throughout the country.' 5 On
the first of these points, the leading case on the subject of the right to a
jury trial in a state court in a case arising under federal legislation, until
the present decision, was that of Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company v. Bombolis.16 The sole question there turned on the applicability,
in a state court, of a local statute calling for a less than unanimous verdict to an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The argument against such a verdict rested on the proposition that, as the' right
arose under federal law and was federal in character, the defendant was
entitled to a jury constituted, and reaching its conclusion, according to the
6 Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 S. Ct. 865, 59 U. Ed. 1433,
Ann. Cas. 1916B 252 (1915), and Covington v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 158 S. C.
194, 155 S. E. 438 (1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 858, 51 S. Ct. 33, 75 L. Ed. 759 (1930).
7 McIntosh v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 182 Mo. App. 288, 168 S. W. 821 (1914).
8 Norfolk, S. R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 U. S. 269, 35 S. Ct. 781, 59 L. Ed. 1303 (1915),
affirming 163 N. C. 351, 79 S. E. 685, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1114 (1913), and 167 N. C.
290, 83 S. E. 360 (1914).
9 Small v. Slocumb, 127 N. C. 464, 37 S. E. 480 (1900), and Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Moser, 277 S. W. 722 (Tenn. App., 1925).
1o Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U. S. 532, 37 S. Ct. 188, 61 L. Ed. 476
(1917) ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 23 S. Ct. 375, 47 1;. Ed. 480.
63 L. R. A. 33 (1903) ; Brant v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 294 Ill. 606, 128 N. E. 732
(1920), affirming 214 Ill. App. 126 (1919).
11 Close v. Portland Terminal Co., 128 Me. 6, 145 A. 388 (1929).
12 Brinkmeier v. Missouri P. R. Co., 244 U. S. 268, 32 S. Ct. 412, 56 L. Ed. 758
(1912), affirming 81 Kan. 101, 105 P. 221 (1909).
13 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Sanford, 182 Ark. 484, 31 S. W. (2d) 963
(1930), cert. den. 283 U. S. 825, 51 S. Ct. 347, 75 L. Ed. 1439 (1931).
14 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Holloway, 246 U. S. 525, 38 S. Ct. 379, 62 L. Ed. 867
(1918), affirming 168 Ky. 262, 181 S. W. 1126 (1916).
15 It was said that ". . . a release of rights under the Act is void when the
employee is induced to sign it by the deliberately false and material statements of
the railroad's authorized representatives made to deceive the employee as to the
contents of the release." - U. S. - at -, 72 S. Ct. 312 at 314, 96 L. Ed. (adv.)
285 at 287. This would hardly affect the Jury Issue, however, for a Judge could
decide the factual situation as well as a Jury, if permitted to do so.
16 241 U. S. 211, 36 S. Ct. 595, 60 L. Ed. 961, U. R. A. 1917A 86, Ann. Cks. 191E
505 (1916).
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course of the common law as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.
Pointing to the fact that the first ten amendments for the federal constitution dealt only with federal action, 7 the court held it to be a necessary corollary that the Seventh Amendment applied only to proceedings
in courts of the United States and did not, in manner whatever, govern
or regulate trial by jury in state courts or the standards to be there applied concerning the same.'
The Seventh Amendment argument was not mentioned in the majority opinion in the instant case but the Bombolis decision came in for
comment when the majority indicated it might have been more in point
had Ohio "abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases including those
arising under the federal act.' "19 That sort of argument would seem to be
based on the proposition that it is better to kill a man outright rather
20
than to submit him to the inconvenience of being merely wounded.
Instead of following the view of the Bombolis case, the majority appeared
to prefer to rest on the holding in Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway,
Inc., 21 wherein it was said that the right to trial by jury was a "basic
and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence.' '22 A
study of the Bailey case, however, reveals that the statement was taken
from the opinion in the case of Jacob v. City of New York, 23 a suit
17 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 55 L. Ed. 97 (1908) ; Brown
v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 77, 44 L. Ed. 119 (1899).
18 See Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bambolis, 241 U. S. 211 at 217, 38 S. Ct. 595,
60 L. Ed. 961 at 963 (1916). The court also stated: ". . . it is conceded that rights
conferred by Congress, as In this case, may be enforced in state courts; but it is
said this can only be provided such courts, in enforcing the Federal right, are to be
treated as Federal courts and must be subjected pro hac vice to the limitations of
the Seventh Amendment. And, of course, if this principle were well founded, the
converse would also be the case, and both Federal and State courts would, by
fluctuating hybridization, be bereft of all real, independent existence. That Is to
say, whether they would be considered as state or Federal courts would, from day
to day, depend not upon the character and source of the authority with which they
were endowed by the government creating them, but upon the mere subject matter
of the controversy which they were considering." 241 U. S. 211 at 221, 38 S. Ct.
595, 60 L. Ed. 961 at 965.

19-

U. S. -

at -,

72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 285 at 288.

In St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okla. 143 at 161, 144 P. 1075 at 1081
(1914), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said: "We apprehend that the state has
the power to abolish a trial by jury altogether; and provide that all questions, both
of law and of fact, should be determined by the court. Should this be done, and
a suit involving a right under the Federal statute be instituted by a party in the
state court, and he be denied a jury trial in accordance with state law, yet if such
party, seeking to enforce his right under the Federal statute, were accorded the
same mode of procedure that all citizens of the state were entitled in the enforcement of rights under the state law, it could not be successfully urged that such
party was entitled to a jury trial on the ground that he was seeking to enforce a
right granted to him by a federal statute." The holding therein was affirmed In
241 U. S. 223, 36 S. Ct. 602, 60 L. Ed. 966 (1916), on the strength of the Bombolis
decision.
21319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 (1943).
22 318 U. S. 350 at 354, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 at 1448.
23315 U. S. 752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166 (1942).
20

CHIICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

brought in a federal district court, where the provisions of the Seventh
Amendment regarding jury trial would be in full force and effect, rather
than in a state court, as was true of both the Bombolis and Dice cases.
It is also important to note that the Jacob case was based on the Jones
Act,2 4 a statute dealing with injuries inflicted on members of the merchant
marine, and thereby brought into play certain special factors to be discussed below. It is true that the Bailey case does state that rights
"which the act creates are federal rights protected by federal, rather
than local rules of law, "25 but that thought bears more directly on the
uniformity argument and scarcely relates to the procedural question.
On the uniformity aspect, the majority opinion in the instant case
declares that "only if federal law controls can the federal Act be given
that uniform application throughout the country essential to effectuate
its purposes." '26 In support of that view, the court cited the case of
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Company, Inc.,27 one dealing with a suit
brought in a Pennsylvania court predicated on the Jones Act as well
as to secure maintenance and cure pursuant to admiralty law. While the
Jones Act incorporates by reference all of the applicable provisions of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and many of the cases thereunder
can properly be used to illustrate principles involved in employment
cases, the citation of the Garrett case provides a fine illustration of the
danger which can arise from applying Jones Act decisions without thought
to employers' liability cases. Speaking of the Jones Act, the court in the
last mentioned case stated that the "law is to be liberally construed to
carry out its full purpose, which was to enlarge admiralty 's protection
to its ward . . . Being an integral part of the maritime law, rights

fashioned by it are to be implemented by admiralty rules not inconsistent
with the Act.'"'2 It happens to be the admiralty doctrine, in contrast to
the Pennsylvania state rule, that the responsibility is on the defendant to
sustain an alleged release, rather than on the plaintiff to overcome it.
It was, therefore, held that the right of the petitioner to be free from
the burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule inhered in
the cause of action, was a part of the very substance of the claim, and
was not to be considered a mere incident to the form of procedure. But
it is evident that the special concern of admiralty law for the interests
24 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 et seq.
25

319 U. S. 350 at 352, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444 at 1447. Authority for that

statement may be found in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34
S. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L. R. A. 1915C 1 (1914), but it applies, if at all, to the
uniformity argument rather than to the jury trial issue. See also U. R. A. 1915C 47
and 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 47.
at -, 72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 285 at 287.
26 U. S. 27 317 U. S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239 (1942).
28 317 U. S. 239 at 248, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239 at 245.
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of seamen lies at the very basis of the decision. Railroad workers, on
the other hand, have never been protected by any similar solicitous concern on the part of the common law. If admiralty rules are to be used
to implement the Jones Act, it may obviously be necessary to require
changes in state practice to effectuate the purposes of that statute, but
it does not follow that similar changes would be required under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act standing alone.
In further development of the uniformity argument, the Dice opinion
noted that, as Congress had granted the employee a right to recover
against his employer for damages negligently inflicted, state laws should
not be controlling in determining what the incidents of the federal right
should be. It is clear, ever since the determination laid down in the
Second Employers' Liability Cases,29 that state laws, insofar as they cover
the same field, have been superseded, but this is true only to the extent
such statutes have dealt with the nature of the employer's liability.30
The broad statement that "federal law controls" covers too much ground
if the decision therein, and in the cases resting thereon, is to be used
as authority. The Federal Employers' Liability Act may operate to
supersede a state statute dealing with liability but it does not, by that
fact, exclude state statutes or rules dealing with the administration of
state courts, provided they do not conflict with specific provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In only one case cited by the majority, that of Brown v. Western
Railway of Alabama,31 was a rule of local procedure involved. It appeared therein that a Georgia rule of practice, similar to the common law
concept, construed all pleadings most strongly against the pleader. The
United States Supreme Court there said that if it failed "to protect
federally created rights from dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in adjudication
of federally created rights could not be achieved. "32 But it is a long
way from picking on a petty procedural rule to reach the goal that, because a federal right is involved, the litigant is entitled to have a local
tribunal operate, in all respects, as would a federal court. In fact, the
29 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.1, 32 S.Ct.
327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44 (1912).
30 The effect of federal intervention has, at times, operated to
previously enjoyed. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S.
635, 58 L. Ed. 1062 (1914), for example, a state statute making a

169, 56 L. Ed.
reduce rights
492, 34 S. Ct.
railroad abso-

lutely responsible for the furnishing of safe equipment to its workers had to yield
to the liability imposed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which conditions
recovery upon a showing of the employer's negligence. See also Panhandle & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 199 S. W. 665 (Tenn. App., 1917), and New York Cent. R. Co. v.
Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 S. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045, Ann. Cas. 1917D 1139 (1917).
31 338 U. S. 294, 70 S. Ct. 105, 94 L. Ed. 100 (1950).
32 338 U. S. 294 at 299, 70 S. Ct. 105, 94 L. Ed. 100 at 104.
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majority opinion in the instant case hardly appears to have given consideration to the potential damage which could be caused by a literal
extension of that doctrine. A valid question is projected whether nationwide uniformity in the application of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to the extent suggested is worth the resulting confusion likely to
occur in the courts of the forty-eight states. 33 As long as local differences
prevail, it should be remembered that when Congress creates a right and
confers jurisdiction on the courts of the states to enforce the right "it
adopts the prevailing rules of procedure in the state. "4 If that is not
what is desired, the litigant is free to effectuate his remedy elsewhere for,
as Justice Frankfurter once pointed out, "the Federal courts are always
available. ' 35 If, instead, he chooses to use the local tribunal, he should
be governed by the consequences attaching to his choice.
W.

F. W
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MASTER AND SERVANT--LIABILITY OF MAsTER FOR TORTS OF SERVANTAFTER AN EXTENSIVE FROLIC OF His OWN, CAN BE

WHETHER SERVANT,

SAID TO BE ONCE MORE IN THE SCOPE OF His EMPLOYMENT MERELY BECAUSE
HE

-AS

TuRNED TOWARD His EMPLOYER'S PLACE OF BUSINESs--The recent

case of Parottov. StandardPaving Company1 involved the Appellate Court
for the First District with the much litigated problem of determining
whether a servant had merely "detoured" from his route or had instead engaged in a "frolic" of his own. Defendant's servant was a truck driver who
worked out of a central garage with no fixed hours. Late in the afternoon on the day of the accident, he had delivered a load of material and
had returned to the very threshold of the employer's garage when his
passengers, fellow employees, inveigled him into driving them to a nearby
tavern. He did this and then drove to his home. He later returned,
picked up the passengers and drove with them to another more distant
tavern where they stayed until the early morning hours. He was en route
33

In 21 C. J. S., Courts, § 526, the point is made that state courts are directed

to enforce the following present or former federal statutes, to-wit: National Industrial Recovery Act, National Prohibition Act, laws relating to public lands, the
Safety Appliance Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Clayton Act, Trading With The
Enemy Act, War Risk Insurance Act, Emergency Price Control Act, Housing and
Rent Act of 1947, Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, in addition to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The volume of
litigation arising under these statutes is an indication of the degree of confusion
which could be caused.
34 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ga. 92, 108 S. E. 618 (1921), cert. den.
260 U. S. 729, 43 S. Ct. 92, 67 L. Ed. 485 (1922). See also Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co.
v. Meadows, 119 Va. 33, 89 S. E. 244 (1916).
35 See dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Brown v. Western Railway of
Alabama, 338 U. S. 294 at 300, 70 S. Ct. 105, 94 L. Ed. 100 at 104.
1345 Ill. App. 486, 104 N. E. (2d) 102 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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from this tavern to the employer's garage when the accident in suit
occurred, causing severe injury to a third person, plaintiff herein. The
trial jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff upon which judgment was entered. The employer-defendant, who had offered no evidence,
appealed and contended the trial court should have directed a verdict in
its favor. The Appellate Court, however, refusing to upset the verdict,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
While the doctrine of respondeat superior may have been applied
from as early as Roman civil law, 2 it was not until 1834 that Baron Parke
originated the nebulous concept of "frolic" and "detour" through the
medium of the case of Joel v. Morison.3 The application of these concepts
to a myriad of factual situations since then has produced a decided lack
of uniformity in result in this country. It is clear, however, that the
proposition that the master is responsible solely because he has entrusted
a vehicle to a servant, advanced in Sleath v. Wilson 4 but expressly overruled by Mitchell v. Crassweller,5 has not been adopted in the United
States. 6 In fact, in several jurisdictions, including the better reasoned
Illinois cases, 7 proof by the plaintiff that the vehicle belonged to the defendant and that it was being driven by the defendant's servant at the
time of the accident raises no more than a rebuttable presumption that
the servant was acting within the scope of his employment.8 Even when
evidence has been offered to overcome that presumption, the court may,
in cases where the deviation is slight and not unusual, determine as a
2 Radin, Handbook of Roman Law, Ch. 5, § 53.
3 6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834). Baron Parke there indicated that a

master is not responsible for injuries caused to others by his servant's unauthorized
negligence while the servant was on a "frolic of his own," but "if the servants,
being on their master's business, took a detour to call upon a friend, the master will
be responsible."
4 9 C. & P. 607, 173 Eng. Rep. 976 (1839).
5 13 C. B. 237, 138 Eng. Rep. 1189 (1853).
6 Patterson v. Kates, 152 F. 481 (1907) ; Symington v. Sipes, 121 Md. 313, 88 A.
134 (1913) ; Fleischner v. Durgin, 207 Mass. 435, 93 N. E. 801 (1911) ; Provo v.
Conrad, 130 Minn. 412, 153 N. W. 753 (1915) ; Ursch v. Heler, 241 S. W. 439 (Mo.
App., 1922) ; Danforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H. 111, 71 A. 535 (1908) ; O'Brien v. Stern
Bros., 223 N. Y. 290, 119 N. E. 550 (1918) ; Colwell v. Aetna Bottle & Stopper Co.,
33 R. 1. 531, 82 A. 388 (1912).
7 Lohr v. Barkman Cartage Co., 335 Ill. 335, 167 N. E. 35 (1929); Kavale v.
Morton Salt Co., 329 Ill. 445, 160 N. E. 752 (1928) ; Howard v. Amerson, 236 Ill.
App. 587 (1925). But see Craig v. Tucker, 264 I1. App. 521 (1932), and Cohen v.

Fayette, 233 Ill. App. 458 at 462 (1924), to the effect that plaintiff must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the servant was not only employed but was

also, at the time, acting within the scope of the employment.
8 Atlanta Laundries, Inc. v. Goldberg, 71 Ga. App. 130, 30 S. U. (2d) 349 (1944)
Simpson v. Egler, 166 Minn. 501, 207 N. WV.724 (1926) ; Moore v. Rosemond, 238
N. Y. 356, 144 N. E. 639 (1924) ; Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576
(1926).
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matter of law that the servant was still executing his master's business.'
Conversely, where the deviation is marked and unusual, the court may
determine that the servant was not on his master's business at all, but on
his own. 10
Cases falling between these extremes are said to involve a
question of fact which must be left to the jury."
The greatest conflict in the decisions seems to arise in those cases
where the servant, engaged in business for the master, has temporarily
abandoned that business and subsequently has resumed, or is about to
resume, his master's activities when the accident occurs. Clearly, when
the servant leaves the premises on the way out to attend to some purely
personal errand, as to eat supper, 12 to return home because his work is
finished, 1 3 or because he has become ill, 14 and irrespective of whether or
not he is, at the time of the accident, using a vehicle belonging to the
master, 1" the decisions all indicate that the master cannot be held liable.
Merely because the servant is disobeying the master's express instructions,
however, is not sufficient to take the servant out of the scope of his
employment' 6 and if the employee's deviation consists solely in giving aid
to distressed fellow travellers of the road, 17 or is undertaken at a time
when the servant can be said to be engaged jointly in the business of his
9 Wagner v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 288 Ill. App. 402, 6 N. E. (2d) 250 (1937) :
Craig v. Tucker, 264 Ill. App. 521 (1932) ; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301.
132 N. E. 97 (1921).
lOBoehmer v. Norton. 328 Ill. App. 17, 65 N. E. (2d) 212 (1946); Keller v.
Maxwell, 256 Ill. App. 19 (1930) ; Szszatkowski v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co.,
209 Ill. App. 460 (1918).
11 Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., 329 Ill. 445, 160 N. E. 752 (1928); Carl Corpor
Brewing & Malting Co. v. Huggins, 96 Ill. App. 144 (1901) ; Moore v. Rosemond,
238 N. Y. 356, 144 N. E. 639 (1924).
12 Pearce v. Industrial Commission, 299 Ill. 161, 132 N. E. 440 (1921) ; Rupp v.
Walgreen Co., 270 Ill. App. 346 (1933) ; Orr v. Thompson Coal Co., 219 Ill. App.
116 (1920) ; Miller v. National Automobile Sales Co., 177 Ill. App. 367 (1913).
13 N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 11, 120 N. E. 457 (1918)
Clark v. Wisconsin Central Railway Co., 261 Ill. 407, 103 N. E. 1053 (1913) ; Cohen
v. Fayette, 233 Ill. App. 458 (1924).
14 Szszatkowski v. Peoples Gas , Light & Coke Co., 209 Ill. App. 460 (1918).
15 Nelson v. Stutz Chicago Factory Branch, 341 Ill. 387, 173 N. E. 394 (1930)
Miller v.
Fogel v. 1324 North Clark Street Bldg. Corp.. 278 Ill. App. 286 (1934)
National Automobile Sales Co.. 177 Ill. App. 367 (1913) ; Clark v. Buckmobile Co.,
107 App. Div. 120, 94 N. Y. S. 771 (1905): Slater v. Advance Thresher Co., 97
Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133 (1906).
But see Orr v. Thompson Coal Co., 219 111. App.
116 (1920), which seems to distinguish between vehicles entrusted to the servant
and those only allowed out under special order.
16 Keedy v. Howe, 72 Ill. 133 (1874), bartender selling liquor contrary to instructions; Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298 (1868), railroad
engineer blowing whistle and frightening horses: Swancutt v. W. M. Trout Auto
Livery Co., 176 Ill. App. 606 (1913), hotel cab driver picking up private passengers.
See also Spice v. Autry, 184 Ind. 1. 110 N. E. 201 (1915) ; Whiteacre v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 252 Mo. 438, 60 S. W. 1009 (1913), affirmed in 239 U. S. 421,
36 S. Ct. 152, 60 L. Ed. 360 (1915).
17 Boalbey v. Smith, 339 Ill. 466, 90 N. E. (2d) 238 (1950); Puttkammer v.
Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 497, 21 N. E. (2d) 575 (1939).
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master as well as his own, there has been no complete turning away,18 so
the master-servant relationship will be considered as having continued.
Assuming that a deviation has occurred, so as to put the servant on
his own responsibility, the English cases indicate that the employee remains outside his employment until he returns to the point of departure. 9
While this rule may be theoretically sound and easy to apply, it could
produce unfortunate results for it is possible that the servant may have
once again devoted himself exclusively to the business of the master without returning to the point of departure. While some jurisdictions in
this country follow the English cases, 20 most others, including Illinois,
are in conflict over the point as to whether the employee returns to the
master's business as soon as he has accomplished his personal objective
and starts to return 2 1 or at some mid-point between the return and the
point of departure.

22

The Appellate Court in the instant case preferred to follow the holding in Kavale v. Morton Salt Company,23 a case which supports the proposition that once a return has been made, so that the servant is once more
acting in the scope of his employment, liability can attach to the employer.
The facts in the two cases are similar except that, in the instant case,
the driver was several miles from the garage and some seven hours overdue when the accident occurred whereas, in the Kavale case, the servant
was in the immediate vicinity and only three hours overdue. Neither

the exact mileage of deviation nor the amount of time overdue seems to
Is Olson Drilling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 386 Ill. 402, 54 N. E. (2d) 452
(1944); Flood v. Bitzer, 313 Ill. App. 359, 40 N. E. (2d) 557 (1942); Devine v.
Ward Baking Co., 188 Ill. App. 588 (1914) ; Carl Corpor Brewing & Malting Co. v.
Huggins, 96 Il. App. 144 (1901) ; Chicago Consolidated Bottling Co. v. McGinnis,
86 Ill. App. 38 (1899) ; Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S. C. 339. 35 S. D3. (2d)
425 (1945).
19 Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237, 138 Eng. Rep. 1.189 (1853) ; Raynor v.
Mitchell, L. R. 2 C. P. 357 (1877) ; O'Reilly v. McCall, 2 Ir. K. B. 42 (1909).
20 Patterson v. Kates, 152 F. 481 (1907) ; Symington v. Sipes, 121 Md. 313, 88 A.
134 (1913) ; Hartnett v. Gryzmish, 218 Mass. 258, 105 N. E. 988 (1914) ; Danfurth
v. Fisher, 75 N. H. 111, 71 A. 535 (1908) ; Colwell v. Aetna Bottle & Stopper Co.,
33 R. 1. 531, 82 A. 388 (1912).
21 Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., 329 111. 445, 160 N. E. 753 (1928) ; Wagner v.
Chicago Motor Coach Co., 288 Ill. App. 402, 6 N. E. (2d) 250 (1937) ; Heelan v.
Guggenheim, 210 Ill. App. 1 (1918) ; Barmore v. Railway Co., 85 Miss. 426, 30 So.
210 (1904) ; Moore v. Rosemond, 238 N. Y. 356, 144 N. E. 639 (1924)
Riley v.
Standard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921) ; Graham v. Henderson, 254
Pa. 137, 98 A. 870 (1916).
22 McKiernan v. L'ehmaier, 85 Conn. 111, 81 A. 969 (1912) ; Public Service Co. of
Northern Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 395 11. 238, 69 N. E. (2d) 875 (1946)
United Disposal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill. 480, 126 N. E. 183 (1920)
International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 111. 489, 118 N. E. 711 (1918)
Keller v. Maxwell, 256 Ill. App. 19 (1930) ; Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192 Mich. 624,
159 N. W. 316 (1916) ; Dockweiler v. American Piano Co., 94 Misc. 712, 160 N. Y. S.
270 (1916).
23 329 Ill. 445, 160 N. E. 752 (1928).
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have influenced the determinations concerning the scope of employment2 4
and, where considered, other factors have shown the issue not really one
in point.2 5 The only Illinois case directly contrary to the Kavale case
is that of Public Service Company of Northern Illinois v. Industrial
Commission,2 but that case may be distinguished on the ground the
proceeding was one to secure workmen's compensation and the deviating
employee was suing rather than some third person injured by his acts.
It is possible the court therein may have felt it had to be stricter in determining the question of whether or not the employee had' returned to
the zone of employment. If so, this admittedly new approach may offer
27
an ingenious explanation of the cleavage to be found in the Illinois cases.
To test the validity of this approach, it becomes necessary to go back
and examine the basic reasons for the respondeat superior doctrine as well
as the principles underlying workmen's compensation statutes. Baty,
after an exhaustive study to determine the reason behind the doctrine of
respondeat superior, finally stated that, in his opinion, the real reason
for the employer's liability is that "the damages are taken from a deep
pocket.' '28 By contrast, Seager indicates that the policy supporting workmen's compensation acts is one by which "the loss to wage earners resulting from the accidents of industry should be regarded as an expense
of production which the employer should bear as he bears the other expenses of production and which, since the burden falls on all employers
alike, he will be able to recover normally in the somewhat higher prices
he will obtain for his goods.''29 Both doctrines appear to be the result
of a practical attempt to place the loss on those who can best bear the
same rather than the outcome of any philosophical or theoretical reasoning
applied to the problem. Such being the case, rules founded on practicality
should certainly be subject to practical distinctions. Employers should
24 The only case in which the decision could be said to be based on either of these
factors is that of Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519
(1922), which case indicated that if the accident occurred after the employee had
been away from his employer's business for more than five hours, even though he
was returning thereto, he could not, as a matter of law, be said to be in the scope
of employment.
25 The case of Nelson v. Stutz Chicago Factory Branch, 341 Ill. 387, 173 N. E. 394
(1930), involved a servant who had no right to use the vehicle at all. In Lohr v.
Barkman Cartage Co., 335 Ill. 335, 167 N. E. 35 (1929), the servant was still on a
"frolic" of his own and had made no attempt to return to his master's business.
See further on this latter point: Central Garage of LaSalle v. Industrial Commission, 286 Ill. 291, 121 N. E. 587 (1918) ; Boehmer v. Norton, 328 Ill. App. 17, 65
N. E. (2d) 212 (1946) ; Craig v. Tucker, 264 Ill. App. 521 (1932).
26 395 Ill. 238, 69 N. E. (2d) 875 (1946).
27 The explanation is, however, one which corresponds with the facts. The Illinois
cases listed in note 22, ante, are all Industrial Commission cases with one exception.
28 Baty, Vicarious Liability, Ch. VIII.
29 Seager, Principles of Economics, p. 601.
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be expected to owe greater responsibilities to third persons who have been
injured by their deviating servants than to such servants themselves.
Nevertheless, there remains the possibility that some new concept
might be adopted which could afford a more equitable solution. If it is
too harsh to hold the employer responsible because of a mere turning
by the deviating employee in the direction of the employer's place of business, a more reasonable solution 0 would be to adopt the foreseeability test
now applied in many tort negligence cases. Under it, an employer could
be held liable whenever the employee has entered the foreseeable zone,
that is the area within which an employer could reasonably expect his
employees to deviate during the course of their employment. Applying
such a standard to the instant case, the driver might well have been considered outside the zone of reasonable deviation for it could be said, as a
matter of law, that no employer would foresee that an employee would
still be acting within the scope of his employment when he was miles from
his place of work and more than seven hours overdue.
W.
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PLOYEE OF HIS RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST COVERED THIRD PARTIES WHO

CAUSE EMPLOYEE's INJURY OR DEATH-As a result of a motor vehicle

collision caused by the alleged negligence of one of defendant's employees,
the plaintiff and his employer, in the recent case of Grasse v. Dealer's

Transport Company,' instituted proceedings to recover damages.

The

first count of the complaint, which was in two counts, presented an ordinary common-law negligence claim on behalf of the injured employee.
The second count, offered by the employer, presented a reimbursement
claim covering items paid to the injured employee by way of workmen's
compensation. The defendant's answer to the first count, relying upon
the first paragraph of Section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act, 2 asserted that the injured employee was without legal capacity to
bring such an action. A motion by the employee-plaintiff to strike the
answer, on the ground that the provision in question, when construed
with Section 3 of the same statute,' was contrary to both the federal and
30 The solution is partly suggested in a note in 23 Col. L. Rev. 444 (1923).
1412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952).
2 Although the defense relied particularly on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48,
§ 166, the text thereof was incorporated in the 1951 revision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
3 Same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.3.
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the state constitutions, was denied in the trial court and the first count of
the complaint was dismissed without prejudice to the pending cause of
4
action of the employer. On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
that judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded with directions
to reinstate the first count, when the high court concluded that the particular provision, as applied to the situation before it, was unconstitutional
by reason of being an arbitrary and capricious attempt to create classifications not warranted in law. 5
The phraseology of the questioned portion of the statute purported
to declare that, when an employee under the act had been injured in the
course of his employment through the negligence of a third-party tortfeasor also under the act, the employee was to be denied his common-law
right of action against such person and was limited to the recovery of
compensation only, and then solely from his employer. The injured employee's common-law rights against the tort-feasor were said to be transferred to his employer but in an altered form, the employer being authorized to sue the covered third-party tort-feasor, as if by way of
subrogation, for the amount of compensation paid or due to the injured
employee. The substitute proceeding would, however, be successful only
if all the elements of a common-law negligence action were proved. 6
Naturally, the employer was to be barred from bringing the derivative
action until the amount of compensation to be paid to the injured employee had been fixed, 7 so it might sometime result in an employer being
barred from obtaining reimbursement if he should be forced to litigate
with his injured employee for a period longer than that permitted for the
institution of a personal injury action.8
In contrast thereto, under the second and third paragraphs of Section
29, a covered employee may sue a non-covered third-party tort-feasor for
appropriate damages in an ordinary common-law negligence action, which
right of action is not transferred to the employer even though he remains
liable to pay compensation to his injured employee. The employer in this
instance, however, is granted a lien, for reimbursement purposes, on the
4 Direct appeal is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
5 The court carefully noted that its holding was limited to the issue before it
and did not operate to render unconstitutional the general scheme for workmen's
compensation: 412 Ill. 179 at 202, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 at 135 et seq. See also
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.25, which contains the customary clause
as to partial invalidity, and Bairn v. Fleck, 406 Ill. 193, 92 N. E. (2d) 770 (1950).
6 City of Taylorville v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 301 Ill. 157, 133
N. 1. 270 (1922).
7 Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Railways Co., 307 Ill. 322, 138 N. E. 658 (1923).
S Under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83 § 15. a personal injury action must
be begun within two years: a wrongful death suit, by ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2,
must be instituted within one year from the date of death. The injured employee,
however, has one year in which to institute compensation proceedings: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, Vol. 1. Ch. 48, § 138.6.
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amount of damages recovered by his employee up to the extent of the
amount of compensation he has been required to pay the employee. If the
employee should fail to institute suit against the third-party tort-feasor
within a specified time, the employer is expressly granted the right to do
so for the benefit of both the employer and the employeeY
These two schemes, when construed with Section 3 of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act, one which automatically imposes the provisions thereof on all employers and employees engaged, as here, in hazardous occupations, serve to create a series of compulsory classifications
which turn on the circumstance of whether or not the third-party tortfeasor is also covered by the statute. For example, the arrangement (1)
distinguishes covered third-party tort-feasors from all other tort-feasors
by limiting their liability for injuries to covered employees; (2) separates
covered employees injured by covered third-party tort-feasors from covered employees injured by third-party tort-feasors not bound by the act,
limiting the recovery of the former to the fixed amount of compensation
while allowing the latter the full remedy of the common-law negligence
action; and (3) segregates covered employers whose employees are injured
by covered third-party tort-feasors from covered employers whose employees are injured by third-party tort-feasors not bound by the act,
limiting the remedy of the former while granting a full and complete
remedy to the latter.
In the course of its opinion, the court compellingly demonstrated
that classifications of the character in question were arbitrary as the
purported bases of the several distinctions were in no way related to the
nature of the tort-feasor's act nor turned on any legal relationship between the tort-feasor and the injured employee. It therefore necessarily
found that the first paragraph of Section 29, when construed with Section
3 of the act, violated federal guarantees of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws as well as state constitutional provisions intended
to prevent the passage of special laws granting special privileges and
designed to insure that each individual should find a remedy in law for
all injuries and wrongs. 10
By its decision, however, the court has exposed a number of other
problems which must be resolved. When the specific provision was first
enacted, in 1913, its validity was then sustained on the basis it was part
of an entirely elective act. Certainly,' no employee could claim an un9 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b). A leeway of three months is
given to the employer to begin suit before the expiration of the appropriate
limitation period which would attach to a suit by the employee. As to the effect
of the employee's suit against the third person on the employer's cause of action,
see Melohn v. Ganley, 344 Ill. App. 316, 100 N. E. (2d) 780 (1951), noted in
40 Ill. B. J. 238.
10 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22, and Art. II, § 19.
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constitutional deprivation of his rights if he made a voluntary waiver
thereof at the time he entered into a contractual relationship with his
employer. 1 ' While most employers and employees are now under the act
by compulsion, there remain circumstances under which they may come
in by election. 12 It is not clear, from the decision in the instant case,
whether the nullified portion of the statute is to remain in effect as to
these parties since the decision deals solely with the question of the combined effect of Sections 3 and 29. There would be fair reason to suppose
that the law has not been changed in this respect, but that remains to be
seen.
It may be that the limited liability heretofore afforded covered thirdparty tort-feasors may have operated to win the support of employers for
the act as a whole, but it is more likely that the subrogation features of
the paragraph in question, features designed to aid in the reimbursement
of any employer for compensation he may have paid to his injured employee, had even greater bearing. The invalidation of the first paragraph
of Section 29 has now undermined that support for it leaves the employer
of an employee injured by a covered third-party tort-feasor without any
statutory guarantee of reimbursement. At best, he is left with the possible
remedy of subrogation, but it may or may not prove adequate as the right
to determine whether to sue the third person rests in the employee's hands
and he, satisfied with the receipt of workmen's compensation, may elect
not to sue.18 The second and third paragraphs of Section 29 specifically
provide only for the circumstance of the uncovered third-party tortfeasor and in no way could be interpreted to support suit by employer
against the covered third-party. In effect, the law, as it now stands,
distinguishes covered employers whose employees are injured by covered
third-party tort-feasors from those whose employees are injured by thirdparty tort-feasors not bound by the act, affording a more adequate remedy
to the latter by express statutory mandate than is given to the former.
These problems, and related issues, would indicate the need for action
by the Illinois legislature to dispel the confusion and injustice that can
follow in the wake of the instant decision. One possible solution is suggested by the history of a similar portion of the Alabama workmen's compensation statute. In 1947, that portion of the Alabama act referring to
11 Keeran v. Peoria, Bloomington & Champaign Traction Co., 277 Ill. 413, 115
N. E. 636 (1917).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.2.
13 It may be significant that there is no recorded case In Illinois where an
employer has maintained a subrogation action on facts like those in the instant
case. The holding in Weaver v. Hodge, 406 Ill. 537, 94 N. E. (2d) 297 (1950),
noted In 29 HIcAGo-KENT LAw REvnrw 284-5, may Illustrate some of the attendant
difficulties.
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covered third-party tort-feasors was repealed 14 and the segment of the
act of that state dealing with uncovered third-party tort-feasors was
modified to apply to all tort-feasors who harmed employees. 1 5 A similar
revision of the second and third paragraphs of Section 29 of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act would assure equal treatment to all employers forced to pay compensation without depriving the covered employees of their right to pursue common-law actions for negligence against
those who harm them. After such an amendment, Illinois would stand
with the majority of states, none of whom distinguish between covered
and uncovered third-party tort-feasors.
P. PAVALON

14 Ala. Code 1940, TIt. 26, § 311, repealed by Acts 1947, p. 485.
15

Ala. Code 1951, Tit. 26, § 312.

